

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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INFO RUFHST/USDEL SALT TWO-I 326

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T O P S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5418

EXDIS

SALT

SECSTATE PLEASE PASS SECDEF

SUBJ: SALT: US STATMENT TO NAC, DECEMBER 15

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR
FARLEY TO COUNCIL AT SALT CONSULTATIONS DECEMBER 15:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. SALT
DELEGATION AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE CURRENT TALKS IN GENEVA
ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
WILL REPORT LATER ON ANY SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY
OCCUR BETWEEN NOW AND THE CLOSE OF THE TALKS, WHICH IS
TO BE ABOUT DECEMBER 21.

SPEECH TO THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF DECEMBER 7.
ROGERS MADE A BRIEF STATEMENT ON THE COURSE OF THE
TALKS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE CURRENT SESSION IS
ONLY EXPLORATORY IN NATURE. THE U.S. INTENT HAS BEEN
TO A GENERAL APPROACH TO A PERMANENT AGREEMENT
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND PROVIDING FOR STRATEGIC
AND ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS. WE
SOUGHT TO LEARN AS MUCH ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION

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LEGATION HAS ARGUED FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A
EMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, TO
RRENT INTERIM AGREEMENT. SUCH AN AGREEMENT
ON THREE ELEMENTS: (1) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
GATE LIMITING THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM
HEAVY BOMBERS FOR EACH SIDE; (2) THE ESTAB-
EQUAL CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS;
EILING ON THE TOTAL THROW WEIGHT OF ICBM FORCES
AND (3) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRAM FOR
CH CEININGS THROUGH REDUCTIONS. IN ADDITION,
APPROPRIATE PROVISION FOR SUBSTITUTION AMONG
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, CONSISTENT WITH
IMITATIONS.

LEGATION HAS ARGUED THAT THE PERMANENT
LD FOCUS ON THE SYSTEMS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE.
MAINTAINED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL CEILINGS
WEIGHT OF THE TOTAL ICBM FORCE ON EACH SIDE AS WELL
ER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD HELP MAINTAIN
OF LAND-BASED FORCES OVER TIME. FURTHER, THE
ARGUED THAT THE BEST WAY, BOTH STRATEGICALLY
Y, OF ACHIEVING EQUAL CEILINGS WOULD BE THROUGH A
UCTIONS RATHER THAN BY A BUILD-UP. THE
, HOWEVER, NOT SUGGESTED ANY SPECIFIC LEVEL TO
ROUGH REDUCTIONS.

LEGATION NOTED IN CONVECTION WITH A SOVIET
MIT STRATEGIC AVIATION ARMANENTS THAT THIS RAISED
AIR DEFENSES. IT DID NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION OF
QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SUCH AS LIMITATIONS ON
THE SOVIET SIDE RECALLED THAT, IN 1970, THE
WAS LEFT FOR DISCUSSION AT FOLLOW-ON TALKS AND
VIEWS ON MIRVS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHANGED
SOVIETS ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF MARVS
RE-ENTRY VEHICLES). WE REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION
E LIMITATIONS IS OPEN FOR DISCUSSIO IN FUTURE

E U.S. SIDE PROPOSED THE PROMPT DRAFTING AND
EVA OF A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ESTABLISHING

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CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE ABM TREATY. IT ALSO PROPOSED
A JOINT WORK PROGRAM FOR FUTURE SESSIONS

DELEGATION HAS NOT COMMENTED ON MANY OF
ITS, EXCEPT BY INTRODUCING CERTAIN PROPOSALS
WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO OUR
POSITIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT REALLY ADDRESSED THE
THREAT WEIGHT LIMIT. THEY HAVE STATED THAT
THE URGENCY OF THIS PROBLEM AND HAVE ASSERTED
THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND
THE PROTOCOL (I.E., PROTOCOL AND AGREED STATEMENTS)
DO NOT COVER THIS PROBLEM.

DELEGATION HAS SOUGHT CONVERSION OF THE
TREATY INTO A PERMANENT ACCORD, EXPANDING ITS
SCOPE TO INCLUDE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS NOT NOW LIMITED.

CONVERSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT INTO
A TREATY. THE SOVIET SIDE TOOK THE VIEW THAT A MORE
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
WEAPONS SHOULD INCLUDE THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT AND SLBMS IN THE FORM IN WHICH THEY
WERE AGREED BY THE SIDES, AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH ARE NOT COVERED
BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME INDICATIONS THAT
THE SOVIETS WILL NOT CONTINUE TO STAND ON THIS POSITION.

WE VIEW THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS A
MEASURE TO FREEZE, IN EFFECT, THE DEPLOYMENT OF
STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE SOVIET APPROACH WOULD NOT, IN OUR
VIEW, PROVIDE AN EQUITABLE AND STABLE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM

ALL "ADD-ONS" THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND ARE
STRATEGIC AVIATION AND MEASURES DEALING WITH

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EXDAS

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SUBJ: SALT: US STATEMENT TO NAC, DECEMBER 15

12. ON THESE POINTS, THEY HAVE ASSUMED AN EXTREME POSITION. SPECIFICALLY, WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC AVIATION, THEY PROPOSED QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS AT AGREED LEVELS ON STRATEGIC BOMBERS, A BAN ON THE USE OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS AS CARRIERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ALL TYPES, A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AND A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE AIR TO-SURFACE MISSILES. IN RESPONSE TO A U.S. QUESTION, THEY SAID THAT THE AGREED LEVELS FOR STRATEGIC BOMBERS COULD NOT BE PRESENT LEVELS FOR EACH SIDE SINCE THESE ARE UNEQUAL.

13. WE POINTED OUT THE INADEQUACY AND INEQUITY OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SINGLE OUT STRATEGIC BOMBERS FOR WHAT AMOUNTS TO A "BAN-THE-BOMB" TYPE PROPOSITION. SUCH A BAN WOULD AFFECT THE LEAST DESTABILIZING COMPONENT OF DETERRENT FORCES. IT WOULD NULLIFY THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF A CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE. WE ALSO NOTED THE ILLOGICALITY OF PROHIBITING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS WHILE NOT

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APPLYING THE SAME PROHIBITION TO OTHER FORMS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. FINALLY, OUR DELEGATION EXPLAINED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A COMPLEX OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC AVIATION ARMAMENTS RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE LIMITATION OF AIR DEFENSES, AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION AND VERIFICATION. WE SAID WE WOULD RETURN TO THE SUBJECT ON AIR DEFENSES.

14. AS A SECOND MAJOR ELEMENT OF ITS POSITION, THE SOVIET DELEGATION ADVANCED EXTREME PROPOSALS ON FBS AND RELATED SUBJECTS. THESE WERE: (1) THE WITHDRAWAL OF SLBM SUBMARINES BEYOND RANGE, WITH LIQUIDATION OF THEIR BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES; (2) CONSIDERATION OF ALL ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER AVIATION AS STRATEGIC REGARDLESS OF LOCATION, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS BEYOND AGREED LIMITS WHICH WOULD PLACE AIRCRAFT BASED THEREON OUT OF RANGE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE; AND (3) THE WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY OF ALL NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT AND ANY NUCLEAR MISSILES THE GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT OF WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND THE LIQUIDATION OF THEIR BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

15. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WENT ON TO ASSERT THAT IN SETTING STRATEGIC LEVELS FOR THE TWO SIDES, ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS, INCLUDING U.S. FBS AND ALLIED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, MUST BE "TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT." THE U.S. DELEGATION REAFFIRMED OUR POSITION ON FBS, AND DID NOT ADVANCE ANY PROPOSAL OR SUGGESTION FOR DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION. THE U.S. INTENDS TO REAFFIRM ITS MAY 24 AND 26 STATEMENTS REJECTING THE VALIDITY OF THE SOVIET CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION FOR ALLIED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES.

16. THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO SUGGESTED SEVERAL LIMITATIONS OR BANS ON LESSER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, WHICH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSION, AND CONCERNING SOME OF WHICH THE TWO SIDES HAD REACHED TENTATIVE AGREEMENT IN 1970-71. THESE PROPOSALS INCLUDED SUCH MATTERS AS A BAN ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE AND WATERBORNE PLATFORMS (EXCEPT SUBMARINES), ON INLAND WATERWAYS, ON THE SEABED OR THE OCEAN FLOOR OF TERRITORIAL SEAS OR SUBSOIL THEREOF, AS WELL AS A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES, AND

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OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES SPECIALLY DESIGNED TO STRIKE
LAND TARGETS.

IN RESPONSE, THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED THERE WAS A
CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON SOME OF THEM, BUT CLEAR
DISAGREEMENT ON OTHERS.

8. THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED CONSIDERATION OF THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THE SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS TO EXERCISE
"RESTRAINT" IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT LIMITED BY AGREEMENT,
AND ALSO NOT TO UNDERTAKE NEW MAJOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS PROGRAMS. WITH RESPECT TO SUCH "MAJOR NEW PROGRAMS,"
THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY HAD IN MIND SUCH U.S. PROGRAMS
AS TRIDENT, B-1, SRAM, SCAD, POSEIDON AND MINUTEMAN-III.
THEY DID NOT CITE ANY "MAJOR NEW PROGRAMS" ON THEIR SIDE
WHICH WOULD BE AFFECTED BY SUCH AN AGREEMENT ON
"RESTRAINT", ALTHOUGH THEY DID STRESS THAT SUCH RESTRAINT
SHOULD BE EQUALLY BINDING ON BOTH SIDES.

9. EARLIER, I REFERRED TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS TO DRAW UP A
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ESTABLISHING THE STANDING
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT
SESSION OF THE GENEVA TALKS. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE
IN SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON THIS DOCUMENT. THE MEMORANDUM
BINDING BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION MAY BE SIGNED BY THE RESPECTIVE
LEGATION AT THE END OF THE CURRENT SESSION.

ALSO DISCUSSING A WORK PROGRAM WHICH WOULD
ERY GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS

MANY, IN FACT TWO SO FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE SET
AL POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. IN THE
THIS HAD GENERALLY BEEN ANTICIPATED. THE
THE SOVIET POSTURE ON THESE ISSUES IS NOT YET
NY CASE, THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF SIMPLY ADDING
AN UNCHANGED INTERIM AGREEMENT OFFERS NO
EACHING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

ONCLUDES MY REPORT TO YOU TODAY ON BEHALF OF
LEGATION. I AM PREPARED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS

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